In the introduction to his beautiful yet
tragically underappreciated Logic and the Basis of Ethics, Arthur Prior
makes the following remark:
I am inclined
to think that almost all that can be said, from a purely logical point of view,
on the issue between naturalism and anti-naturalism, has already been said in two
quite brief sections in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (II. iii. 3, and
III. i. 1) and in one quite brief chapter in Reid's Essays on the Active Powers
(V. vii). At all events, a thorough mastery of these three items
would provide anyone with a complete set of tools for cutting away the thick
growths of sophistry which seem in all periods to thrive on the soil of
Moral Philosophy.
I am inclined to agree (though I find the
derogatory use of 'sophistry' unfortunate!), and have been trying, in a variety
of ways, to make a case for Prior's view ever since I first read LBE in
graduate school. At present, however, I want to follow Prior's suggestion
and take a closer look at one of the more oft-discussed passages in the second
Hume section referred to above: the famous remarks about 'is' and 'ought'.
It is, perhaps, thought by many that here
we find expressed what has subsequently become known as 'Hume's Law', declaring
the impossibility of deriving normative claims from descriptive ones, 'oughts'
from 'iss'. Presumably, those who think this have the following remark of
Hume's in mind, namely
...a reason should be
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can
be a deduction
from others, which are entirely different from it.
This remark, however, is not a
declaration of what is possible or not, but rather a challenge, or, better, an
expression of incredulity. In any event, full appreciation of Hume's
stance on the matter is impossible, I think, unless we pay close attention to
what he says before this remark. The relevant passage in full:
In every system
of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes
the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a
sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or
affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and
at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which
are entirely different from it.
Hume, it is clear, has two
challenges for those who traffic in oughts: First, assuming that ought
is different from is, what does it mean? What function does it
perform in the statements in which it figures? Second, assuming, again,
that it is different from is, how does one deduce, or derive such
statements from the more familiar is statements? It is this second claim
that those who talk of Hume's law are focused on. But what seems more fundamental
is that Hume is expressing, whether feigned or sincere, ignorance of the
significance of ought.
If we take Hume seriously here, as I am
inclined to do, his position is nihilistic about normativity: there simply is
no other thing than the natural, descriptive world; nothing that ought
picks out that is does not. Nothing, at least, that he--or
we--have any hope of understanding.
One can, of course, disagree with Hume on
these matters. Reid, for one, did. In the chapter referred to by
Prior we find the following:
We may here
observe, that it is acknowledged, that the words ought and ought not
express some relation or affirmation; but a relation or affirmation which Mr.
Hume thought inexplicable, or, at least, inconsistent with his system of
morals. He must, therefore, have thought, that they ought not to be used
in treating of that subject. He likewise makes two demands, and,
taking it for granted that they cannot be satisfied, is persuaded, that an
attention to this is sufficient to subvert all the vulgar systems of
morals. The first demand is, that ought and ought
not be explained. To a man that understands English, there are
surely no words that require explanation less. Are not all men
taught, from their early years, that they ought not to lie, nor steal, nor
swear falsely? But Mr. Hume thinks,
that men never understood what these precepts mean, or rather that they
are unintelligible. If this be so, I think indeed it will follow, that
all the vulgar systems of morals are subverted. Dr. Johnson, in his Dictionary, explains
the word ought to signify, being obliged by duty; and I know no
better explication that can be given of it.
His second demand
is, that a reason should be given why this relation should be a deduction from
others which are entirely different from it. This is to demand a reason
for what does not exist. The first principles of morals are not
deductions. They are self-evident; and their truth, like that of other axioms,
is perceived without reasoning or deduction. And moral truths that are not
self-evident, are deduced, not from relations quite
different from them, but from the first principles of morals
This is what we would refer to today as
'non-naturalism'. Make of it what you will. What I want to suggest
here, though, is that is rather hard to see what other position on
normativity one might take. Specifically, I think there is here, in the
combination of Hume's two challenges, an argument against the very cogency of
'naturalistic realism' about normativity. If one is a naturalist, then,
presumably, one thinks that ought is not different from is.
But then it becomes hard to understand just what such a theorist does think
normativity amounts to. Furthermore, if ought statements are
indeed translatable without remainder into is statements, why would it
be 'altogether inconceivable' that they be deduced from other is
statements? True, not all such statement follow validly from all others,
but some do. 'Hume's Law', however, isn't supposed to have
exceptions. What is open to the Humean, however, is to claim that the
relevant class of is statement is actually about one's preferences, or
motivations, and these are not deducible from descriptions of the various
states of the world at which they might be directed. But this is not
something that a naturalist who also fancies himself a 'cognitivist' or a
'realist' will be comfortable with. But what, then, is such a naturalist
left with? What does such a view actually involve? I don't see how
to make sense of it myself. Hence I think that you either take
normativity seriously and are therefore a non-naturalist, or you are a
naturalist and you don't.
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